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Over the past few decades professional sports leagues have 
regularly contended, in response to antitrust challenges to 
agreements between their members, that they should be 
viewed as a single economic enterprise and therefore incapa-
ble of conspiring within the meaning of Section 1 of the Sher-
man Antitrust Act (“Section 1”).1  The “single entity” defense 
asserts that a league and its members should be conceived of 
as organizationally equivalent to a partnership with geo-
graphically scattered offices or a corporation and its subsidi-
aries.2  The contention is that although the league is com-
prised of separately owned teams, these clubs must cooperate 
as if they were a single economic undertaking for the league 
to operate effectively.  In short, the argument is that the clubs 
are joint suppliers of a league product and they should be 
viewed as necessary collaborators that supply nothing alone.3  
The consequence of accepting the single entity defense 
would be that the necessary “contract, combination, or con-
spiracy” under Section 1 would be absent.4  Rather, the ar-
rangements between league members, such as rules govern-
ing sale and relocation of franchises, would be regarded as the 
internal regulations of a single legal and economic body.  Ac-
cordingly, league arrangements would be immune from scru-
 
*  Litigation associate at Cole, Schotz, Meisel, Forman & Leonard P.A., New York, N.Y. 
**  Zephaniah Swift Professor of Law, University of Connecticut School of Law. 
 1.  15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012). 
 2.  See generally Maxwell M. Blecher & Howard F. Daniels, Professional Sports 
and the “Single Entity” Defense Under Section One of the Sherman Act, 4 WHITTIER L. 
REV. 217 (1982). 
 3.  See STEFAN SZYMANSKI, PLAYBOOKS AND CHECKBOOKS: AN INTRODUCTION TO 
THE ECONOMICS OF MODERN SPORTS 51-53 (2009); PAUL WEILER, LEVELING THE 
PLAYING FIELD 298-304 (2000) (the nature of the league). 
 4.  See 15 U.S.C. § 1. 
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tiny under Section 1.  The United States Supreme Court deci-
sively rejected this claim in American Needle, Inc. v. National 
Football League,5 a case on appeal from the Court of Appeals 
for the Seventh Circuit that involved a challenge to the joint 
management of National Football League (NFL) teams’ intel-
lectual property.  Prior to American Needle, the lower federal 
courts generally rejected the single entity defense.6  Instead, 
the predominant judicial response was to view a league as a 
form of joint venture with multiple firms and to apply the rule 
of reason in assessing the antitrust legality of agreements be-
tween league members.7 
The American Needle dispute originated with a change in 
practice by the NFL’s marketing arm.  For more than twenty 
years American Needle had received a non-exclusive license 
from NFL Properties, the league’s marketing and licensing 
arm,8 to manufacture headwear bearing the NFL clubs’ 
names and logos (e.g., baseball caps).9  But, in 2000, NFL 
Properties altered its policy and granted a ten-year exclusive 
license to manufacture team-branded headwear to Reebok, 
American Needle’s principal competitor.10  This shift from 
multiple vendors led American Needle to file an antitrust suit 
in the Northern District of Illinois, near the company’s head-
quarters, in which it contended that the new licensing ar-
 
 5.  American Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, 130 S. Ct. 2201 (2010). 
 6.  See, e.g., Sullivan v. Nat’l Football League, 34 F.3d 1091 (1st Cir. 1994); Philip 
J. Closius, Professional Sports and Antitrust Law: The Ground Rules of Immunity, Ex-
emption, and Liability, in GOVERNMENT AND SPORT: THE PUBLIC POLICY ISSUES 140, 
149-53 (Arthur T. Johnson & James H. Frey eds., 1985). 
 7.  See, e.g., Clarett v. Nat’l Football League, 306 F. Supp. 2d 379 (S.D.N.Y. 2004), 
rev’d on other grounds, 369 F.3d 124 (2d Cir. 2004); Stephen F. Ross, Competition Law 
as a Constraint on Monopolistic Exploitation by Sports Leagues and Clubs, 19 OXFORD 
REV. ECON. POL’Y 569, 578 (2003) (view that leagues are analogous to corporations is 
severely flawed; courts have rejected argument based on formal organization of leagues 
as unincorporated associations of separately owned teams that do not share profits or 
losses, the independent management of each team, and active competition among teams 
that would occur but for challenged restraints). 
 8.  Founded in 1963, NFL Properties, LLC, operates as a subsidiary of National 
Football League, Inc.  It engages in licensing and marketing of the team-owned trade-
marks and logos.  The legality under the antitrust laws of the agreement to engage in 
this marketing collectively is being challenged in the American Needle litigation. 
 9.  Sales of the NFL merchandise constituted approximately 25% of American 
Needle’s annual revenues.  See Allison Petty, Illinois Company Takes on NFL in Su-
preme Court, CHI. DAILY L. BULL. Jan. 12, 2010, at 1. 
 10.  American Needle, 130 S. Ct. at 2205. 
HYNE-KURLANTZICK_AMERICAN NEEDLE 4/15/2013  6:31 PM 
2013] American Needle’s Puzzling Choice of Forum 347 
 
rangement violated Section 1.11  The lawsuit, in fact, contest-
ed the legality of two related “agreements”: 1) the “agree-
ment” among NFL members to market their intellectual 
property collectively rather than individually; and 2) the ex-
clusive licensing agreement between the joint decision-maker 
and Reebok.12 
The NFL responded to the challenge to the first of these 
agreements with the single entity defense.  The District 
Court13 and Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals14 both accepted 
the single entity claim with respect to the aspect of league 
and team operations involving exploitation of intellectual 
property rights, holding that the league members’ decision to 
act jointly in licensing was exempt from antitrust scrutiny.  
Accordingly, both courts granted partial summary judgment 
to the NFL defendants.  The Supreme Court unanimously re-
versed, concluding that the NFL’s licensing activities consti-
tute concerted action that is not beyond the coverage of Sec-
tion 1.15 
The focus of this article is not on the correctness vel non of 
the Supreme Court decision, though we do believe the case 
was correctly decided.  Rather we want to look at a question of 
litigation strategy, in particular the choice of forum by the 
plaintiff in the lawsuit, American Needle, and its lawyer.  
When assessed against the existing array of appellate court 
 
 11.  American Needle’s headquarters are located in Buffalo Grove, Illinois, approx-
imately thirty miles northwest of Chicago.  A small family-owned company with about 
fifty employees, its financial figures are not public.  American Needle, Inc. v. New Orle-
ans La. Saints, 385 F. Supp. 2d 687, 689 (N.D. Ill. 2005). 
 12.  In fact, there were four actions taken by the league and its members that are 
potentially relevant to the dispute–—the decision to begin collective licensing efforts, 
the decision to make the marketing arm, National Football League Properties, the 
teams’ exclusive licensing agent, the decision to offer only a blanket license, and the de-
cision to engage with a single headwear licensee.  American Needle’s construction of its 
claim in the lower courts was somewhat unclear as to which of these actions it was 
challenging.  See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 
17-18, 19- 20, American Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, 130 S. Ct. 2201 (2009) 
(No. 08-661). 
 13.  American Needle, Inc. v. New Orleans Louisiana Saints, 496 F. Supp. 2d 941 
(N.D. Ill. 2007) (NFL, NFLP, and NFL teams qualified as single entity and therefore 
were incapable of conspiring in violation of Sherman Act section 1). 
 14.  American Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, 538 F. 3d 736 (7th Cir. 2008) 
(with regard to licensing of intellectual property NFL and its constituent teams consti-
tuted a single entity worthy of immunity). 
 15.  American Needle, 130 S. Ct. at 2217. 
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decisions, that choice appears mystifying.  And understanding 
the choice underlines the contingencies that shape decisions 
that, in turn, produce consequences of moment. 
In assessing the plaintiff’s choice of forum it is necessary 
to examine the procedural and substantive landscape it faced.  
Procedurally, the principal considerations would have been 
venue and jurisdiction.  Examination of these topics indicates 
that a prospective plaintiff would have wide geographical lati-
tude when selecting the federal district court in which to file 
an antitrust complaint.  With respect to venue – identification 
of the district where an action may be properly commenced – 
the special venue provisions of the Clayton Antitrust Act are 
expansive, designed primarily for the convenience of the 
plaintiff by removing obstacles to the assertion of federal ju-
risdiction, and facilitative of private antitrust enforcement.  
Section 4 of the Clayton Antitrust Act (“Section 4”), which ap-
plies to actions against natural persons, corporations, and 
other business entities, permits an antitrust action to be filed 
in any district in which the defendant “resides or is found or 
has an agent.”16   
An unincorporated association, such as the NFL, “resides” 
in all the judicial districts in which it is doing business and is 
“found” in any district where it continuously carries on any 
substantial part of its activities.17  Among other wide-ranging 
activities, the NFL broadcasts its games regionally and na-
tionally; it markets its intellectual property nationally; and it 
conducts labor relations on an industry-wide basis.  Moreover, 
its thirty-two member teams play regularly scheduled games 
from which the league derives substantial financial benefit in 
twenty-three states.  As a matter of practical, commercial re-
ality,18 these undertakings constitute doing business through-
out much, if not all, of the country, and therefore a large 
number of federal district courts would be appropriate fora in 
which a suit might be heard.  
 
 16.  15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (2012): “[A]ny person who shall be injured in his business or 
property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor in any 
district court of the United States in the district in which the defendant resides or is 
found or has an agent . . . .” 
 17.  1 JULIAN O. VON KALINOWSKI, ET AL., ANTITRUST LAWS AND TRADE 
REGULATION § 163.03[3][a][iii] (2d ed. 1996). 
 18.  See generally United States v. Scophony Corp. of America, 333 U.S. 795 (1948). 
HYNE-KURLANTZICK_AMERICAN NEEDLE 4/15/2013  6:31 PM 
2013] American Needle’s Puzzling Choice of Forum 349 
 
With respect to personal jurisdiction, the general princi-
ples established in International Shoe and its progeny govern 
the assertion of judicial authority in antitrust actions.19  
These principles require: 1) that the defendant “have certain 
minimum contacts with [the forum] such that maintenance of 
the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and 
substantial justice;”20 and 2) that the assertion of jurisdiction 
be fair and reasonable under the circumstances, with fairness 
measured by considering the burden on the defendant, the in-
terest of the forum state, and the plaintiff’s interest in secur-
ing relief.21  The NFL, as previously noted, is a national en-
terprise, and its widespread activities involve more than 
minimum contacts with an abundant number of states.  In-
deed, the same contacts that satisfy the venue requirements 
will ordinarily establish in personam jurisdiction.22  Accord-
ingly, the plaintiff could choose among an extensive array of 
courts in which judicial authority over the NFL would exist. 
If identification of a forum that meets jurisdictional and 
venue requirements for suing the NFL is a fairly simple task, 
then picking an acceptable forum for the NFL’s member 
teams is even less restricted.  Section 12 of the Clayton Act 
(“Section 12”) is broader than Section 4 as it concerns venue 
and service of process on corporations.  Section 12 permits 
suits against corporations to be heard in districts where the 
corporation is an inhabitant, is found, or transacts business.23  
As with the NFL, the broadcasting, merchandising, labor, and 
scouting activities of the individual teams subjects them to 
 
 19.  Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). 
 20.  Id. at 316 (internal quotations omitted). 
 21.  Asahi Metal Ind. Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 480 U.S. 102 (1987). 
 22.  The courts have interpreted the special venue provisions so expansively that in 
antitrust cases, the issues of venue, personal jurisdiction (in the constitutional sense), 
and service of process have become virtually congruent.  2 ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST 
LAW, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS 1215 (6th ed. 2007). 
 23.  15 U.S.C. § 22 (2012): “Any suit, action, or proceeding under the antitrust laws 
against a corporation may be brought not only in the judicial district whereof it is an 
inhabitant, but also in any district wherein it may be found or transacts business; and 
all process in such cases may be served in the district of which it is an inhabitant, or 
wherever it may be found.” 
As a practical matter, an individual team is unlikely to contest venue, as it has no in-
terest in fragmenting the litigation and would prefer joint legal representation.  Thus, 
in American Needle, one law firm represented all the league members, and the same 
law firm also represented the league. 
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personal jurisdiction in multiple states. 
Rule Four of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governs 
service of process in antitrust litigation.24  Rule Four presents 
no obstacle for our hypothetical plaintiff as it authorizes use 
of the long-arm statutes of the state in which the federal court 
hearing the case sits.  
The substantive vista facing the plaintiff was clear and 
well-developed.  Virtually every federal court that confronted 
the single-entity claim in the sports context rejected the ar-
gument that sports leagues should be treated as a single enti-
ty and that arrangements between member teams should 
therefore be free from scrutiny under Section 1.25  More pre-
cisely, this characterization was dismissed by the Courts of 
Appeals for the First Circuit,26 Second Circuit,27 Third Cir-
cuit,28 Sixth Circuit,29 and Ninth Circuit.30  The one and only 
 
 24.  FED. R. CIV. P. 4(e).  Also, in at least some antitrust cases, Section 12 of the 
Clayton Act authorizes nationwide service of process on a corporate defendant.  See su-
pra note 23. 
 25.  E.g., Stephen F. Ross & Stefan Szymanski, Antitrust and Inefficient Joint Ven-
tures: Why Sports Leagues Should Look More Like McDonald’s and Less Like the United 
Nations, 16 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV 213, 238 (2006) (single-entity treatment of sports 
leagues has been “overwhelmingly rejected”). 
 26.  Sullivan v. Nat’l Football League, 34 F.3d 1091 (1st Cir. 1994) (challenge to 
league policy against sale of ownership interest in team to public through offering of 
publicly traded stock); see Fraser v. Major League Soccer, L.L.C., 284 F.3d 47, 55–59 
(1st Cir. 2002). 
 27.  North American Soccer League v. Nat’l Football League, 670 F.2d 1249 (2d Cir. 
1982) (challenge to NFL prohibition on members investing in team in another profes-
sional sports league); see Volvo N. Am. Corp. v. Men’s Int’l Prof’l Tennis Council, 857 
F.2d 55, 70-71 (2d Cir. 1988). 
 28.  Mid-South Grizzlies v. Nat’l Football League, 720 F.2d 772 (3d Cir. 1983) (chal-
lenge to league team entry rule; rejection of qualified applicant). 
 29.  Nat’l Hockey Players Ass’n v. Plymouth Whalers Hockey Club, 419 F.3d 462 
(6th Cir. 2005) (challenge to league eligibility rule limiting number of “overage” players 
permitted to each team). 
 30.  Los Angeles Mem. Coliseum Comm’n v. Nat’l Football League, 726 F.2d 1381 
(9th Cir. 1984) (challenge to league team relocation rule); see Freeman v. San Diego 
Ass’n of Realtors, 322 F.3d 113, 1148–49 (9th Cir. 2003).  The Courts of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia and the Eighth Circuit had also implicitly indicated a lack of sym-
pathy for the defense.  See Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173, 1183-87 (D.C. Cir. 
1978) (“given the joint-venture status of the NFL clubs;” application of rule of reason to 
assess legality of draft); Mackey v. Nat’l Football League, 543 F.2d 606, 616-20 (8th Cir. 
1976) (joint venture character of league calls for rejection of application of per se rules 
but requires assessment under rule of reason). 
Without going into detail as to each court’s reasoning in support of its conclusion that 
league arrangements–whether rules about franchise location, franchise sale, team en-
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Court of Appeals that indicated some sympathy for the single-
entity argument with respect to a sports league was the Sev-
enth Circuit.  While not ruling on the issue, the court demon-
strated an attraction to the proposition that, at least for some 
purposes, a sports league could well be deemed a single enti-
ty.31  
Aware that the NFL would raise the single entity defense, 
a prudent and unconstrained plaintiff, then, presumably 
would opt to file its complaint in the First, Second, Third, 
Sixth, or Ninth Circuits.32  At a minimum, it would avoid fil-
ing in the Seventh Circuit.  Yet, American Needle did just 
 
try, or cross-ownership–constitute concerted rather than independent action, one can 
say that though these courts rejected the characterization of a league as a single entity 
comprised of separately managed divisions and therefore incapable of forming the com-
bination, contract, or conspiracy required by Section 1, they have understood that a 
league has a dual personality—in some respects it is an enterprise in its own right, but 
it also makes rules for its members’ marketplace behavior.  Therefore, courts have 
largely recognized that sports leagues lie in between ordinary business firms, whose 
collaboration is suspect, and completely integrated enterprises subject only to Section 2 
of the Sherman Act.  And they have also recognized that these situations require “in-
between” substantive antitrust rules.  7 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, 
ANTITRUST LAW 326-29 (2d ed. 2003).  See generally Judd E. Stone & Joshua D. Wright, 
Antitrust Formalism Is Dead! Long Live Antitrust Formalism! Some Implications of 
American Needle v. NFL, 2009–2010 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 369 (need to tailor rule of rea-
son to take account of the economic realities surrounding complicated, interdependent 
enterprises). 
 31.  Chicago Prof’l Sports Ltd. P’ship v. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n, 95 F.3d 593, 598–
600 (7th Cir. 1996). 
 32.  Another prior antitrust challenge to NFL arrangements, in this case the 
league’s draft eligibility rules, featured a similarly perplexing choice of venue by coun-
sel.  In Clarett v. NFL, plaintiff filed suit in the Southern District of New York.  The 
central issue was the scope of the non-statutory labor exemption from antitrust scruti-
ny.  The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed the district court and held 
that the exemption applied and shielded the NFL rules from antitrust review.  Clarett 
v. Nat’l Football League, 369 F.3d 124 (2d Cir. 2004).  Several elements made the choice 
of venue puzzling.  The Second Circuit had never expressed an opinion about the reach 
of the non-statutory exemption whereas other Circuits, such as the Eighth Circuit, had 
addressed the question and articulated a standard favorable to the plaintiff.  See 
Mackey v. Nat’l Football League, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976).  Moreover one of the 
judges on the Second Circuit at the time was Ralph Winter, who, as an academic, had 
authored a well-known article urging a very broad reading of the non-statutory exemp-
tion, a reading that, if accepted, surely would have led to rejection of Clarett’s claim.  
See Michael S.  Jacobs & Ralph Winter, Antitrust Principles and Collective Bargaining: 
Of Superstars in Peonage, 81 YALE L.J. 1 (1971).  While the Supreme Court decision in 
Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231 (1996), decided subsequent to Mackey, gov-
erned the Clarett  case, surely Clarett would have had a greater likelihood of success if 
the case had been filed in the Eighth rather than the Second Circuit. 
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that by commencing its action in the Northern District of Illi-
nois.  What, other than professional irresponsibility on the 
part of the General Counsel, might explain this decision?  As-
sessment of the choice inevitably involves some speculation.  
Let’s compose a graduated set of hypotheticals and evalu-
ate each of them.  First, assume that the plaintiff’s attorney 
was unaware of the legal landscape because his research of 
the relevant federal case law was inadequate.  What is the 
appropriate legal, professional, and moral appraisal?  The ul-
timate question should be whether the lawyer has done what 
a lawyer should do in light of all relevant concerns and au-
thorities.  It is said that a lawyer has an obligation of compe-
tence.33  But that reference, in fact, has two components.  One 
element raises a question of capacity.  That is, does the per-
son generally possess the requisite knowledge, skills, and pro-
fessional qualifications to competently handle a matter?  The 
other element focuses on whether the person has handled the 
particular matter competently.34  In our hypothetical the at-
torney’s inquiry into and analysis of the legal aspects of the 
dispute, in particular the attorney’s failure to ascertain readi-
ly accessible precedents, was deficient, particularly in light of 
what was at stake.35  Not only was complex litigation in-
volved, but also the filing decision could have resulted in a 
quick defeat precluding the court from hearing the claim on 
its antitrust merits.36  
 
 33.  See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.1 (2002) (competence; “a law-
yer shall provide competent representation to a client”).  See generally 1 GEOFFREY C. 
HAZARD, JR. & W. WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING § 3.2 (2001) (“The moral 
basis of [Rule 1.1] is that a lawyer’s lack of ‘legal knowledge and skill’ almost always 
results from a failure to seek it.”) 
 34.  See id. 
 35.  What was involved here was not a thoughtful opinion on a difficult or unset-
tled question that later proves wrong.  Nor, presumably, was it a decision made under 
urgent time pressure. 
 36.  As noted previously, see supra note 12, two related agreements were being 
contested.  Summary judgment, based on the single entity argument–—had it not been 
reversed on appeal by the Supreme Court—meant that the plaintiff would not have the 
opportunity to present evidence that the agreement among NFL members to jointly 
market their intellectual property constituted a violation of Section 1. 
This situation also raises the issue of when a nonspecialist attorney is obliged to either 
refer a case to or associate with a specialist.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW 
GOVERNING LAWYERS  § 52 cmt. d (2000).  We do not know what Jeffrey Carey, Ameri-
can Needle’s General Counsel, told his client about his qualifications to pursue an anti-
trust claim, and, of course, nothing precluded him from acquiring the competence of an 
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Now, let’s assume that the plaintiff’s attorney conducted 
sufficient research and, as a result, was aware of the legal 
landscape surrounding the single entity issue, but neverthe-
less chose to file suit in the Seventh Circuit.  Why might he 
have done that, and can the justifications withstand criti-
cism?  It is often stated that lawyers’ tactical or strategic deci-
sions are immune from challenge as the basis for a malprac-
tice claim.37  Lawyers are, and should be, accorded a wide 
range of discretion in practice technique, free of second-
guessing.38  But that proposition is conclusory here.  That is, 
what makes a decision “tactical”?  What qualifies as a strate-
gic judgment?  For example, what if the lawyer selected the 
venue for reasons of convenience?  The lawyer was the Gen-
eral Counsel for American Needle, and the federal court in 
Chicago was closest to his office and corporate headquarters.  
Would that be deemed a tactical judgment that turned out 
badly, but is still shielded from scrutiny?39  Hardly.  Moreo-
ver, a decision based upon professional judgment can still give 
rise to liability as the lawyer must exercise a reasonable de-
 
ordinary specialist.  In fact, only Mr. Carey’s name appears on all briefs filed before the 
trial court and the Seventh Circuit.  See generally Complaint, Motions, and Briefs, 
American Needle Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, 130 S. Ct. 2201 (2009) (No. 08-661).  The 
briefs submitted to the United States Supreme Court bear the names of Meir Feder, 
Andrew D. Bradt, David M. Cooper, Glen D. Nager, and Joe Sims, all of the firm Jones, 
Day, in addition to that of Jeffrey Carey.  Glen Nager, an experienced appellate advo-
cate, delivered the oral argument before the Supreme Court.  See Supplemental Brief of 
Petitioner 13, American Needle Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, 130 S. Ct. 2201 (2009) 
(No. 08-661); see also Reply Brief of Petitioner 31, American Needle Inc. v. Nat’l Foot-
ball League, 130 S. Ct. 2201 (2009) (No. 08-661). 
 37.  See RONALD E. MALLEN ET AL., 2 LEGAL MALPRACTICE § 19.14 (2013) (need for 
an advocate’s immunity from liability for judgmental errors); see, e.g., Biomet Inc. v. 
Finnegan Henderson L.L.P., 967 A.2d 662, 665-66 (D.C. 2009) (judgmental immunity—
attorney not liable for choice of trial tactics or good faith exercise of professional judg-
ment); Puppolo v. Donovan & O’Connor, L.L.C., 35 A.3d 166, 172-73 (Vt. 2011) (strate-
gic decisions, such as which expert to retain ,which arguments to pursue, and whether 
to file a recusal motion, are within the discretion of the attorney); Halvorsen v. Fergu-
son, 735 P.2d 675, 681  (Wash. Ct. App. 1986) (generally errors in judgment or trial tac-
tics do not subject an attorney to liability for malpractice). 
 38.  See, e.g., Hazard & Hodes, supra note 33, at §§ 3.2, 4.3 (broadly defined zone of 
professional discretion). 
 39.  Woodruff v. Tomlin, 616 F.2d 924, 937 (6th Cir. 1980) (an attorneys failure to 
interview potential favorable witnesses does not constitute exercise of professional 
judgment but rather neglect of client’s cause); MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.3 
cmt. (2002) (“A lawyer should pursue a matter on behalf of a client despite . . . personal 
inconvenience to the lawyer . . . .). 
HYNE-KURLANTZICK_AMERICAN NEEDLE 4/15/2013  6:31 PM 
354 Seton Hall Journal of Sports and Entertainment Law [Vol. 23.2 
 
gree of care and professional skill in reaching that decision.  
Put differently, characterizing a decision or recommendation 
as an exercise of judgment does not end the inquiry, it still 
leaves the question of whether that exercise was “reasona-
ble.”40  
A possible plausible explanation for a filing in the North-
ern District of Illinois might be that the litigation was con-
ceived as a “test” case.  That is, the plaintiff sought to secure 
a Seventh Circuit rejection of the single-entity argument, 
thereby bringing it in line with the other Circuits that had 
addressed the question, and, in the absence of a favorable 
Seventh Circuit ruling, a decision by the Supreme Court that 
dismissed the characterization.  But there is no reason to 
think that such a conception was being pursued, and, if it 
were, the strategy would have been an extraordinarily risky 
one in terms of protecting the client’s interests.  There is no 
indication that the case was funded by a set of interested par-
ties in addition to American Needle, and there were no ami-
cus briefs filed in support of American Needle in the appellate 
court.  There were amicus briefs before the Supreme Court, 
but there is no reason to believe that any of these actors made 
a financial contribution to defray the costs of litigation.41  
More fundamentally, such a “test” case strategy would dis-
serve American Needle’s interests.  Rather than obtaining an 
assured district court victory on the single entity issue by fil-
ing in another circuit, this approach risked a defeat at the dis-
trict court and appellate level with the additional expense in-
volved.  Moreover, the lawyer could offer no assurance that 
the Supreme Court would hear the case if the Seventh Circuit 
accepted the single-entity argument.  Though a circuit split is 
a strong argument to present in a petition for certiorari, the 
Court grants a tiny percentage of these petitions.42  Finally, 
 
 40.  Gelsomino v. Gorov, 502 N.E.2d 264, 267 (Ill. App. Ct.1986); see also Ziegel-
heim v. Apollo, 607 A.2d 1298, 1304 (N.J. 1992) (“If plaintiff’s expert’s opinion were 
credited . . . then [her attorney] very well could have been found negligent in advising 
her that she could expect to win only ten to twenty percent of the marital estate.”). 
 41.  Amicus briefs in support of American Needle, the petitioner, were submitted 
by the player unions of the four major professional sports leagues; the American Anti-
trust Institute and the Consumer Federation of America; a set of economists; the NFL 
Coaches Association, and the United States.  See generally American Needle Inc. v. 
Nat’l Football League, 130 S. Ct. 2201 (2009). 
 42.  See, e.g., David C. Thompson, An Empirical Analysis of Supreme Court Certio-
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American Needle is a small, privately held company employ-
ing approximately fifty individuals.43  It is not an “institution-
al” litigant that would benefit in other, foreseeable cases from 
securing greater circuit uniformity or a Supreme Court rul-
ing.  Its interest was in winning this case, and in winning it 
without additional, unnecessary litigation expense.  
In defense of the lawyer’s action, one might claim that crit-
icism of the filing decision is unwarranted as, after all, the 
case was commenced at its “natural” or “logical” location, close 
by the plaintiff’s headquarters, and choice of another site 
would have involved “forum shopping,” a practice to be dis-
couraged.  Admittedly, the judicial system has an efficiency 
interest in funneling cases to those locales that have a connec-
tion to either the parties or the events that gave rise to the 
dispute.  But this interest, along with concern for the reason-
ableness of the forum from the defendant’s perspective, is 
served by the law of venue, which places geographical limita-
tions on the plaintiff’s choice of court.  And in this case, as 
previously noted, venue was appropriate in numerous loca-
tions outside the Seventh Circuit.44  Moreover, critical refer-
ence to “forum shopping” is misplaced.  What is involved here 
is not an attorney gaming the system by looking at and choos-
ing among multiple state jurisdictions or by employing the 
“related case” designation when filing suit in order to maneu-
ver a case before a particular judge.45  Rather, enjoined to do 
his best for his client, the lawyer invokes a single federal law 
in a federal judicial system that tolerates variation and circuit 
 
rari Petition Procedures: The Call for Response and the Call for the Views of the Solici-
tor General, 16 GEO. MASON L. REV. 237, 241 (2009) (of 8,517 petitions filed in Court’s 
2005-–06 Term only 78 were granted). 
 43.  American Needle is a privately-held company; therefore financial information 
about its revenues and profits is not publicly available.  However, the company employs 
approximately fifty employees, and at the time sales of NFL team products comprised 
25% of its annual sales.  Anna Marie Kukec, Buffalo Grove Firm Could Change Way 
NFL Does Business, DAILY HERALD (Ill.), Jan. 14, 2010, 
http://www.dailyherald.com/story/?id=350779 
 44.  The non-Seventh Circuit district court closest to Chicago is the Western Dis-
trict of Michigan in Grand Rapids, which is in the Sixth Circuit and is 177 miles (and 
presumably three hours) northeast of Chicago. 
 45.  See Joseph Goldstein, Judge Lands at Center of a New York Legal Mystery, 
N.Y. SUN (Dec. 3, 2007), http://www.nysun.com/new-york/judge-lands-at-center-of-a-
new-york-legal-mystery/67380 (use of related case administrative designation by plain-
tiffs’ lawyers to judge-shop). 
HYNE-KURLANTZICK_AMERICAN NEEDLE 4/15/2013  6:31 PM 
356 Seton Hall Journal of Sports and Entertainment Law [Vol. 23.2 
 
splits.46 
Ironically, American Needle’s choice of venue ultimately 
produced an opportunity for the NFL, and other sports 
leagues, to seek national vindication of its single-entity view, 
an opportunity with which it would not otherwise have been 
presented and one it unsurprisingly embraced.  When Ameri-
can Needle sought Supreme Court review of the Seventh Cir-
cuit’s decision, the NFL, though the winning party below, 
supported the petition for certiorari.47  This unusual step by 
the league reflected two considerations.  First was the large 
potential benefit and small potential cost of a Supreme Court 
decision.  If the league gained the Court’s acceptance of the 
single-entity argument, the beneficial consequences would be 
significant as such an endorsement would probably preclude a 
future Section 1 challenge to any of the league’s “internal” ar-
rangements, such as its rules governing franchise entry, sale, 
and relocation.  On the other hand, if the Court rejected the 
argument, as it did, the league would essentially be situated 
where it was before commencement of the litigation, when 
almost all Circuits dismissed the single-entity characteriza-
tion.  Second, the chance to move to the Supreme Court was 
exceptional and therefore to be uniquely seized in that a so-
phisticated and unconstrained antitrust practitioner probably 
would not have filed the suit in the Seventh Circuit (nor 
would a sophisticated future plaintiff institute suit there). 
Of course, American Needle was ultimately successful in 
the Supreme Court, but the costs imposed by filing in the 
Seventh Circuit were substantial.  The additional expense 
caused by this filing decision can be illustrated by a compari-
son between the likely course of the case in the Sixth and 
 
 46.  The offices of the prime parties to the litigation are situated outside Chicago 
(American Needle) and in New York City (NFL).  Moreover, the NFL is one of the par-
ties to the challenged agreement with Reebok.  So New York, which is in the Second 
Circuit, would seem as “logical” a place for the litigation as Chicago. 
 47.  See Brief for the NFL Respondents at 3-4, American Needle Inc. v. Nat’l Foot-
ball League, 130 S. Ct. 2201 (2009) (No. 08-661) (“Although the result reached by the 
court below is correct . . . . [the] NFL Respondents are taking the unusual step of sup-
porting certiorari in an effort to secure a uniform rule that (i) recognizes the single-
entity nature of highly integrated joint ventures. . . .”) (emphasis omitted).  In fact, the 
NFL sought an expansive holding that it, and other professional sports leagues, could 
not be implicated under section 1 under any circumstances whatsoever via Copperweld 
Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984). 
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Seventh Circuits.  Had the case commenced in the Sixth Cir-
cuit, the district court would have likely ruled for the plaintiff 
on the single entity issue.  Unless the defendant could meet 
the onerous requirements for allowance of an interlocutory 
appeal,48 it could not have appealed the issue immediately as 
it would not have been a final judgment.  Whichever side won 
at the trial level, an appeal would have been taken.  If plain-
tiff won the appeal on the single-entity issue, a further appeal 
to the Supreme Court, by grant of a petition for certiorari, 
would have been unlikely since there would not have been a 
conflict on the question among the circuit courts of appeal.  In 
contrast, with the actual filing in the Seventh Circuit, the dis-
trict court ruled for the defendant on the single entity issue, 
and appeals to the Seventh Circuit and the Supreme Court 
followed.  The case was then returned to the district court for 
a trial.  Thus, although there would still be an appeal of the 
single entity issue, under the second scenario, American Nee-
dle experiences two appeals to the Circuit Court of Appeals 
rather than one as well as an appeal to the Supreme Court.  
The result is a sizeable increase in litigation expenses.   
In the end, the decision to file the case in the Northern 
District of Illinois invites one of four responses: first, the 
choice constitutes malpractice; second, it violates a rule of 
professional responsibility; third, while it constitutes neither 
malpractice nor an ethical misstep, it remains worthy of criti-
cism; and fourth, the behavior was appropriate and offers no 
grounds for criticism.  In fact–and despite what initially ap-
peared to be the perplexing character of the selection–the 
fourth response is apt.  A number of considerations, none wor-
thy of disapproval, dictated the filing decision.  Most critical 
 
 48.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (2012) 
When a district judge, in making in a civil action an order not otherwise ap-
pealable under this section, shall be of the opinion that such order involves a 
controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for differ-
ence of opinion and that an immediate appeal from the order may materially 
advance the ultimate termination of the litigation, he shall so state in writing 
in such order.  The Court of Appeals which would have jurisdiction of an ap-
peal of such action may thereupon, in its discretion, permit an appeal to be 
taken from such order, if application is made to it within ten days after the en-
try of the order. . . . 
Since the district court judge’s ruling would have been consistent with precedent in the 
Sixth Circuit (and in all other circuits), it is highly unlikely that he, and the appellate 
court, would have certified an interlocutory appeal. 
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was a financial constraint.  American Needle, a small compa-
ny, was not in a position to hire outside counsel in another 
state and to compensate them on an hourly basis.  This finan-
cial limitation comported with the determination by the com-
pany’s general counsel to handle the litigation himself.  The 
general counsel is a highly experienced attorney whose back-
ground includes years of major-city, large-firm practice.  That 
he chose to educate and pursue the matter himself after con-
sidering hiring several antitrust plaintiffs’ lawyers was not 
unreasonable.  The other, though less central, factor in the fil-
ing decision was counsel’s judgment that the facts of the 
American Needle case would not bring the NFL within the 
language of the Seventh Circuit Bulls’ opinion that had indi-
cated sympathy for the single entity defense.  While that 
judgment may have been naive, and turned out to be mistak-
en, it can hardly be deemed incompetent. 
Thus, this set of contingencies and exigencies explains 
what appears, on first glance, to be an inexplicable choice of 
forum.  The decision resulting from these factors initiated, in 
turn, an expensive journey that offered the defendant a sur-
prising, and welcome, appellate opportunity that, in the end, 
produced a Supreme Court antitrust precedent with implica-
tions for both professional sports and the commercial world 
beyond. 
 
